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## U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (INFO)

09MAR12

INTEGRATED SUPPORT (II) CONTR

CONTROL: 08MAR12-FEYK-0138-4YCR

SPECIAL AGENT

I/COMMANDER NAVY REGION JAPAN, YOKOSUKA, JAPAN/IDENTIFICATION OF HSP VULNERABILITIES AND COORDINATION WITH NAVAL AUDIT SERVICE

MADE AT/FEYK/YOKOSUKA JAPAN<sup>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)</sup>

- (C) NCISRA Yokosuka, Japan ROI (INFO)/S/MILITARY AGENCY SERVICES PTY LTD, SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA/CCN: 280CT11-FEYK-0637-4MCR
- (D) NCISRA Yokosuka, Japan ROI (INFO)/I/COMSUBGRU-7/YOKOSUKA, JAPAN/IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL VULNERABILITIES TO USN BY HUSBANDING SERVICES PROVIDERS

NARRATIVE

REFERENCES (A)<sup>(b)(7)(A)</sup>

(B)

1. On O8Mar12, Reporting Agent (RA) participated in a conference call (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

b)(6). (b)(7)(C) As background, b)(6). contacted RA on 02Mar12 to initiate contact and schedule the phone call. (b)(7)(C) related that NAS Guam was going to begin researching vulnerabilities related to Husbanding Service Providers (HSP) in the Far East region. b)(6). (c) asked RA if there were any potential areas already identified by NCIS as areas for NAS to focus their research as HSP covers a very wide breadth of topics.

2. During the phone conversation, RA explained her role as the NCIS Economic Crimes Special Agent for the Far East and pursuant to these duties, RA is partially integrated within the acquisition commands as set forth in Reference (A). RA explained that in the seven months she has been in the Far East, (b)(7)(A)

Reference (B) pertains.

3. RA related the vulnerabilities begin with the written contract. For example, RA was notified of an issue in Sep11 regarding S/GDMA charging the USN a "demerge" fee. According to the source of the information, the USN utilized S/GDMA as the HSP for Collection, Holding and Transfer (CHT) for sewage waste removal. GDMA utilized a barge for

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this service. GDMA invoiced the USN for the CHT service as well as charging a fee for GDMA's inability to service other vessels while they are servicing the USN vessel. When RA brought this issue to the Contracting Department at Naval Supply Command (NAVSUP), RA was informed the demerge was written into the contract and it was contractually legal. When pushing the issue further, RA was notified by [D(G). (b)(7)(C) who was not in position at

the time of the contract agreement, that it was "just bad contract writing." The NAS team commented that it did seem like a bad idea as it appears that S/GDMA charged the USN for servicing the vessel and for not being able to service any other vessels while being paid by the USN.

4. RA then provided information regarding Reference (B). RA related
(b)(7)(A)

(b)(7)(A)	RA
then informed of <sup>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)</sup>	
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	who provided information related
to a HSP called Military Agency	Services (MAS), Sydney, Australia. MAS
	o the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and
the USN for services provided f	ree of charge by the RAN and <sup>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)</sup>
himself. The information provide	ed by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was submitted to NCISRA
Singapore in Reference (C). RA	used the example of <sup>(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)</sup> and the
follow-up meeting with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to expla	ain their methods of administration of

foreign port visits for COMSUBGRU-7 submarines in the Far East Region; Reference (D) pertains.

5. RA explained how <sup>[b)(6), (b)(7)(C)</sup> previous military service and years of civilian experience enable him to identify what services are necessary, reasonably priced, and reliable, in order to make decisions on what payments from HSP's are legitimate and which are not. <sup>[b)(6), (b)(7)(C)</sup> also is in close communications with <sup>[b)(6), (b)(7)(C)</sup> who selects the HSP's for port visits via S/GDMA's online website that provides three separate contractors' bids for services for every service requested by COMSUBGRU-7. The NAS team seemed impressed by <sup>[b)(6), (b)(7)(C)</sup> work model and agreed it could benefit the USN in general, if their model were to be attributed to the entire surface navy as well.

6.  $\frac{[b](6)}{[b](7)(C)}$  asked RA if it were possible to arrange attendance at a foreign port visit for a USN submarine, small ship (Destroyer, Cruiser, or Frigate), and aircraft carrier in order to observe what occurs during a foreign port visit and to see how they are managed. RA agreed to request information on escorting any of the NAS personnel for a foreign port visit for any of the above mentioned types of vessels. NAS personnel also specifically requested that  $\frac{[b](6)}{[b](6)}$ .

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of them.

On 08Mar12, RA consulted with Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) on the potential attendance of multiple foreign port visits with NAS. SSA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) concurred with the idea and advised RA to research further into ship schedules and locations for potential funding constraints. RA also notified (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) via email of the potential contact from NAS personnel and for the possibility of participating in upcoming COMSUBGRU-7 foreign port visits.

8. Further interaction with NAS Guam is expected and will be reported via future informational reports.

PARTICIPANTS (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Supervisory Special Agent, NCISRA Yokosuka, Japan

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